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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal's water household is characterized by a basic contradiction. While the 
Himalayas contain vast water resources, which feed the big rivers of the northern 
part of the South Indian continent, the geological and ecological conditions make 
it difficult to put water to economic use. The high potential for hydro-energy is 
tempered by geological and social factors that make its development highly prob-
lematic.1 Irrigation is difficult and hazardous because of the steep and unstable 
mountains with their annually recurring landslides and mudflows. Yet without 
irrigation that allows the bringing of water in sufficient quantity to the appropri-
ate place at the right time, most water would flow away unused and agriculture 
would not be productive enough to feed the fast growing population. In practice, 
therefore, many areas in Nepal either suffer from or are faced with a constant and 
serious threat of water scarcity. Throughout Nepal, wate^is the subject of serious 
and at times violent conflict among its users. In the more densely populated areas 
where industry is growing, the increasing demand for water for different pur-
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poses, such as irrigation, drinking water and industrial use, has led to intense 
intra and inter-sectoral competition over water. Scarcity of and competition over 
water are crucial social, political and legal issues in Nepal today. Irrigation, 
intended to solve the problem of water scarcity, can only do so to a limited extent 
while it creates its own scarcity and competition problems. 
Irrigation has been known for thousands of years in Nepal.2 For a long time 
the various rulers and their governments were interested in the revenues only 
and put taxes on irrigation works and irrigated land. For that purpose they regu-
lated land tenure and stimulated irrigation by providing local elites and land-
lords with feudal grants. Some irrigation systems have been built at the specific 
directive of a ruler, but most irrigation works were built at the initiative of 
feudal landlords, other rich landowners or religious leaders. After the demise of 
the feudal system, irrigation became more and more a matter of the farmers who 
received water from the canal, but the families of the former feudal landlords 
still exert considerable influence on management and operation of irrigation 
systems. Only recently have government agencies, often with the support of 
international donors, become actively involved in building, operating and main-
taining irrigation systems. Many new systems are built and existing systems are 
rehabilitated and enlarged. 
• Government and development project intervention has had a great impact on 
access to and distribution of water and the management of the irrigation systems, 
and in many cases this has led to serious problems. One of the major reasons for 
this has been that such projects are launched without much knowledge of and 
insight into the functioning of existing irrigation systems and the rights and oblig-
ations relating to water, land and system management. Pre-set technocratic and 
bureaucratic notions of how irrigation systems ought to be managed are forced 
upon water users, who are lured into cooperation with the bait of large credit. 
facilities. New organizations, Water Users Associations, have to be formed by all 
potential users within the command area, without considering what this might 
mean for prior users. Large irrigation projects that showed little sensitivity to the 
existing rights and to the needs and wishes among the local population have met 
with overt or tacit resistance. The Nepal Government and donor agencies are 
becoming increasingly aware of these problems, and there are signs of policy 
change. Turnover policies figure prominently on the national agenda, especially 
since recent studies have indicated that farmer managed systems tend to be more 
effective than agency managed systems.2* However, the fact that new material 
infrastructures and enlargement of command areas always imply changes in 
water rights is still rarely considered a problem for planners, whose main concern 
is the development of more, better and more efficient irrigation. Reactions to 
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these smaller rehabilitation projects are diverse. Those who expect to gain 
(better) access to water where they were excluded before, are in favour of gov-
ernment intervention and tend to de-emphasize prior rights by stressing the gov-
ernment's legitimate involvement. Others, notably those who controlled the old 
system and had full rights to the water, are less supportive of the intervention and 
criticize the expropriation of their rights. On the whole, however, local people 
share the critique that their needs, existing relationships and rights are being 
neglected by the project management. 
Over the years, several studies have been carried out in the field of water law, 
the results of which were presented at a workshop held in Kathmandu, 22-24 
January 1996.3 These studies document the old and new water righl problems in 
irrigation systems. One of the striking results that have come out of these studies 
is the fact that rights to water over the past decades appear to have been under 
almost permanent negotiation in situations of scarcity that may be more or less 
acute, more or less permanent and may pertain to a whole population of an area 
or to certain persons only. Rights to access, allocation and distribution of water, 
as well as obligations and rights to contribute labour and material to the mainte-
nance and repair of irrigation systems, are renegotiated over and over again. As 
a consequence, these negotiated orders are highly provisional and temporary. 
This chapter will show that these negotiated orders which embody elements 
of state, customary and religious legal rule systems, are crucial to understanding 
the working of irrigation systèlris. The important legal issue concerning water 
rights in Nepal does not seem tolie in a contradiction between alternative and 
contradictory legal formulations of water rights, but rather in the provisional 
character of the negotiations over water rights. The significance of this is partic-
ularly great because of the high frequency of these negotiations. In this chapter it 
is argued that a combination of factors has led to the recurring negotiating of 
rights and obligations concerning irrigation water. It is due to the geomorphic 
conditions, which make shifting and rebuilding canals and irrigation works fre-
quently necessary. It is further due to demographic developments, notably 
migration. This necessitates enlargement of irrigated areas and causes problems 
of how to include or exclude newcomers of various caste, status and ethnicity. 
Also changing irrigation techniques and cropping patterns have changed the irri-
gation patterns substantially. Finally, changing regulations of land tenure and 
local administration under the various rulers and governments, and more 
recently, regulations and management forms imposed by donors, have repeat-
edly necessitated new regulations within and between frrigation systems. ^ 
After a brief historical overview of the political and legal development of irri-
gation in Nepal and of the principles on which water rights are established, the 
arguments will be illustrated by two cases. One brings out changes in irrigation 
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arrangements resulting from recurring negotiations between higher caste and 
higher status migrants and lower caste and lower status original settlers, under 
conditions of natural catastrophes and technological innovation and government 
intervention. The other case concentrates on the negotiations among old and new 
users as a result of changing cropping patterns, migration and government 
intervention. 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
With 141,000 km2 Nepal is slightly larger than England. Of the total area, over 
one third (3.97 Mha) is cultivated, of which 2.37 Mha is hill and mountainous 
land, and 1.6 Mha is situated in the lowland at the southern border, called the 
Terai. Only 15 per cent of the hilly areas can be irrigated, of which half is actu-
ally irrigated. The rest of the land under cultivation depends on monsoon rains, 
which fall during a four-month period between June and September.4 There is 
some debate as to how much irrigation there was before the late eighteenth 
century, but it is certain that irrigation has been known for centuries and some of 
the present systems are very old.5 Before the end of the eighteenth century 
demographic pressure on land was not such that it required intensification of 
agriculture, but there is evidence that rulers pressed for intensification In order to 
extract taxes. Irrigation systems were built by temple communities or by individ-
uals. Temples often had extensive irrigation works attached to them. Many 
temples received religious endowments, guthi, from a ruler to build irrigation 
works in order to increase their income, but common people also could form a 
guthi and together build an irrigation system of which both the priests and the 
ordinary farmers profited. However, most irrigation systems were built by 
wealthier individuals, especially birta and jagir grant owners, owners of grants 
of land to which various privileges were attached. The birta owner was exempt 
from taxation and was entitled to draft tenants for work on irrigation systems. 
He had also judicial authority and could collect fines.. The jagir owner had 
similar but less secure privileges. Tenants rarely built irrigation systems at their 
own initiative, due to a lack of means and because of insecure land titles. Rulers 
never managed and operated irrigation systems themselves. The systems were 
supervised by the feudal landlord, or by the landowner at whose initiative the 
canal was built, but the actual labour was done by tenants, bonded labourers and 
slaves. Birta and jagir owners were hardly controlled by any central government 
and acted more or less freely in the management of irrigation systems. During 
the wars that ultimately led to Nepal's unification in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, land titles became extremely insecure while tax pressures increased, not 
only for ordinary farmers, but even for birta grant holders whose land was often 
Jayanta Bandyopadhyay and Dipak Gyawali, "Ecological and political aspects of Himalayan 
water resource management". The Himalaya-Ganga: Contending with interlinkages in a 
complex system, 4 Water Nepal 19, supra note 1. 
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confiscated by the various rulers who happened to control an area. According to 
Benjamin,6 this greatly hindered further development of irrigation systems. 
It was not until Nepal was united and settled down, that the network of irriga-
tion systems started to expand. This was to some extent stimulated by the regula-
tions of the Law on Reclamation of Wastelands of 1853 and the Muluki Ain 
(Basic Law) of 1853, in which land belonging to the state was "to be redistributed 
in proportion to the available area among the local population on the basis of 
'physical capacity and size of the family'".7 A person who reclaimed wasteland 
or who built irrigation works on it with his own resources became owner of them. 
This meant that a person could obtain more land by investing in irrigation than 
through land redistribution.8 The Muluki Ain also for the first time-laid down the 
principle of first use for the builder of a canal with his own expenses or physical 
labour, and the primacy of access to water for the field closest to the source of 
water. It further laid down the obligation of repair by joint labour or provision of 
labourers by the landowners using the canal. Only if the costs of repair exceeded 
the possibilities of the owners, the Talukdar (landlord or rent collector) could 
apply for support to the government. If a canal was not repaired during three con-
secutive years, the Talukdar could do so on his own or government expenses and 
was then allowed to evict the tenants or landowners. Thus the fundaments of state 
regulation were laid in the Muluki Ain of 1853, but it is said to have been a 
codification of what already existed as customary law. Benjamin reports that by 
lack of an effective judicial and administrative organization, the building and 
management of irrigation systems remained a matter of local initiative until the 
1950s. The government stimulated intensification of agriculture and provided for 
tax exemption during the first three years after construction of a canal, but it was 
not involved directly in building irrigation systems. 
In contemporary Nepal, access to and distribution of water is highly complex. 
Migration of large numbers of people, from India and from different areas 
within Nepal, often caused by political pressure from the many different rulers, 
has been endemic for centuries. During the Mogul period, for example, many 
Brahmins were persecuted and moved from northern India to what is now Nepal 
to live under a Hindu ruler. As a result, Nepal is highly stratified on the basis of 
both caste and ethnicity and most regions in Nepal are ethnically and caste-wise 
highly mixed. Far more members of low castes and of peripheral ethnic groups 
exist among the poor than among the large landowners, and in the state adminis-
tration there is an overwhelming over-representation of the higher castes.9 
Ibid.-
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Demographic developments, the growth of energy demand and industry, as 
well as intensification of agriculture and changing cropping patterns have 
increased demands for water in the more densely populated areas of Nepal, 
notably the Kathmandu valley and the Terai, but also in more remote areas. The 
irrigated areas have been greatly expanded throughout Nepal. Today there are 
more than 17,000 irrigation systems in operation.10 Of the total irrigated area 
70 per cent is irrigated by farmer managed systems." In the hills over 90 per 
cent of all systems have been built and are managed by farmers. The fact that the 
majority of irrigation systems are managed by farmers by no means implies that 
there is equality in rights to irrigation water. Though there had been some land 
redistribution under the Muluki Ain of 1853, and some attempts to reform the 
land tenure system were made in the first half of the twentieth century, until the 
1950s, most arable land was controlled by large landowners, often former feudal 
landlords, usually belonging to the higher castes. With the Land Reform Act of 
1964, large landholdings were to be dissolved and ceilings were put on land 
ownership.12 Since then some land redistribution has taken place, though the Act 
has been poorly implemented. Today land is still unequally distributed and the 
bottom 60 per cent of landowners own only 20 per cent. One-third of all rural 
families are tenants and 10-20 per cent of all households are landless.13 In the 
western regions bonded labour still exists, although slavery was abandoned in 
the 1920s.14 
After the revolution of 1951 the government started to play a more active role 
in agriculture, land tenure and irrigation. It enacted several laws in which the 
state claimed increasing control over water. In the Electricity and Related 
Resources Act of 1967, for example, the state established ownership of irriga-
tion systems that were rehabilitated or expanded by state investments, but it was . 
not until the Water Resources Act of 1992 and the Water Resources Rules of 
1994, that the state proclaimed ownership of all water. The ideology behind the 
law is that the state is both entitled and obliged to develop the country and inter-
vene in all matters of water for that purpose. Hence enlargement of areas under 
cultivation and improvement of irrigation efficiency are considered a task of the 
government. Administrative changes in local government, to some extent 
specifically aiming at an improvement of local water management, accompanied 
these reforms. The feudal landlords were replaced by a panchayat (council) 
system and later by the present institution of VDC (Village Development 
Committee). However, the former feudal landlords usually remained very 
10
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influential. They often obtained important positions in the new administrative 
structure and since the introduction of the multi-party system, many have good 
connections in political parties. Where they have not managed to obtain a posi-
tion in the new political and administrative structures, there is a lot of competi-
tion among the old and new authorities. 
In order to cope with the increasing demand for water, the government, till the 
1950s only remotely interested in irrigation as a source of income, has started to 
improve and enlarge many existing systems and to build new irrigation systems, 
often in cooperation with donor agencies such as the World Bank, the 
Agricultural Development Bank, CARE/Nepal and ILO. Some of the larger pro-
jects set off a new wave of migration. In 1953, Nepal suffered great floods and 
landslides, washing away many villages in the hill regions. At that time the 
Nepal Government had started the Rapti Valley Multipurpose Development 
Project, a large project to eradicate malaria from the southern region in the Terai 
and make it suitable for agriculture. The Terai has a somewhat special position 
in the history of Nepal. The Rana rulers from the middle of the nineteenth 
century on, appointed pargana chaudary, feudal district heads, and zamindars, 
feudal landlords and village heads, who were responsible for land revenue col-
lection. Zamindars initiated the building of many irrigation canals, for which 
they used a system of compulsory labour, jharahi, of the local Tharu and Darai 
population. Tharus developedjiigh skills in canal building. Some of the present 
systems go back to that period.15 For a long time the area remained thinly popu-
lated. The area could become Nepal's main area of agricultural production after 
it was freed of malaria some 40 years ago. The Rapti Valley project, started in 
the 1974, set off a vast immigration movement from the hills to the Chitwan 
area in the Rapti River watershed. Migrants from the hills started to move into 
the area, bought land arid settled as farmers. Within a few decades the area has 
turned from a sparsely populated area in which only a few indigenous Tharu 
communities managed to live, into a densely populated and intensively culti-
vated area in which Tharu and migrants of many different ethnic backgrounds 
from the hills live side by side. Ethnicity, caste, and class differences have 
created a highly complex and uneasy cohabitation.in which competition over 
water has become intense and at times violent.16 
3. LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCESS, DISTRIBUTION, 
ALLOCATION, OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT 
The historical account already gives some indication of the legal provisions 
upon which water rights can be based. One can observe an increasing legal 
A.N. Shukla et al., "Dynamism in water rights and 'arbitration on water right conflicts: cases of 
farmer managed irrigation systems form East Chitwan". Paper presented at the workshop on 
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control by the state of all water related matters, culminating in the Water 
Resources Act of 1992 which vested the ownership of all water resources in the 
Kingdom of Nepal (section 3). While section 4, clause 1 states that "no person 
shall be entitled to utilize the water resources without obtaining a license under 
this Act", no licenses are required for most water uses in rural areas, such as 
drinking water, irrigation, water mills or water sources on the land of a 
landowner (section 4, clause 2). The Water Resources Act does not specifically 
indicate the legal basis for such uses, but it is generally assumed that the previ-
ous legal rules and principles relating to control and use of water resources 
remain recognized as valid. However, they are subject to intervention by the 
government, as the Electricity and Related Water Resources Act of 1967 had 
already stated. The Water Resources Act emphasizes the authority of the gov-
ernment to acquire and develop water resources and the land for purposes of 
extensive public uses (section 4, clause 2) against compensation. Section 11 
which provides for the turnover of state developed water resources gives some 
indication of the meaning of ownership under this Act, for it provides that "the 
concerned users associations shall have the ownership [authors' italics] over the 
project turned over to it ... and the concerned users associations shall operate 
such project as if it had got a license under this Act" (section 11, clause 2). So 
unless the state government has taken over an irrigation system, the following 
rules and principles still prevail. 
3.1 Rights of access 
Rights of access are based on a combination of land ownership and inheritance 
and on labour input and other investments for the construction and the mainte-
nance of infrastructure. 
(a) Landowners participating by their own labour or expenses in building the 
canal obtain inheritable priority rights over the water. The labour input of 
tenants is usually ascribed to the landowners. 
(b) Full rights in an irrigation system involve certain obligations: to retain one's 
right to water, one must contribute to the maintenance of the system. Full 
rights imply a right to a share of water both in monsoon and in dry season 
irrigation. Sometimes it also works the other way around: participation in 
the maintenance may provide a full right to the water. 
(c) First users have priority over newcomers. Migrants need the consent of 
original settlers to build a canal. 
(d) Fields irrigated of old (sabik) have prior rights to water over all others. 
(e) A field closest to the source has a prior right over the fields further away. 
(0 One may not control more water than one can use for one's own purposes. 
Surplus water must be shared with minor rights holders or even outsiders, 
(g) A new intake may not be built in such a way that it diminishes the water 
intake of existing systems; it must be built at a sufficient distance from a 
downstream intake, 
(h) Building an intake may not destroy the land around the intake, 
(j) Landowners may not prevent an irrigation canal being led over their land, 
but they must be compensated. 
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(k) A water source confined to a particular plot of land is property of the 
landowner and does not have to be shared. 
(1) Government funded systems are a public facility and therefore not subject 
to existing local principles and arrangements. 
3.2 Distribution 
The distribution of water is usually controlled by specially appointed function-
aries.17 A distinction must be made between water abundance and water scarcity. 
In water abundant areas during the monsoon, water flows continuously and 
rightholders may tap freely. Abundance and scarcity, however, to a large extent 
depend on the crops that are under cultivation. This means that, though there is 
more water during monsoon than during the winter season, during monsoon 
water may be more scarce, so that only rice fields (khet land) may be irrigated, 
whereas during the winter season owners of unlevelled land (pakho or bhit) are 
often also entitled to irrigation. If there is not enough water, a distribution 
system has to be developed. This usually is based on rotational use, or on a com-
bination of several rotational mechanisms, each adjusted to a particular phase in 
the cropping cycle. There is considerable variation in the basis upon which rota-
tion takes place (duration, volume, order). Over time an irrigation system may 
change its rotation principles several times. Durga and R. Pradhan report that a 
system in the Tanahu district started out with a water distribution system for 
monsoon rice in which a period" of continuous irrigation was followed by two 
different rotation systems. With the introduction of a new rice variety they 
turned to a three-stage rotational system for monsoon rice.18 
The order of water application may start with the head-reachers or with the 
tail-enders. Which option is chosen is not unimportant, for generally speaking it 
is of advantage to be among the first in a rotational system. Rights on volume 
relate to the branch canals and to individual fields. The volume that goes in the 
branches may depend on the total area that is to be served by the branches, or on 
the labour and financial input in the maintenance of the main canal; but it also 
may be shared in equal shares, independent of the size of the land in the respec-
tive command area. More or less permanent distribution works distribute the 
water over the different branches. 
Over time, systems employ different operators and controlling officers see e.g. K.C. Durga and 
R.Pradhan, "Conflict and conflict management: waterrights in a farmer managed irrigation 
system in Tanahu". Paper presented at the workshop on Waterrights, Conflict, and Policy 5, 
Kathmandu, 22-24 Jan. 1996. It may be done by a professional operator who is appointed and 
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on the time the government became first involved in a system, government regulation may have 
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At the level of individual fields, there is again considerable variation. 
Sometimes the volume is directly related to the size of the fields, but there are 
cases in which the quality of the soil, as well as the type of crops, is also taken 
into account. In the most equal distribution systems there is also a rotation as to 
day and night turns; in unequal systems, some persons, notably low caste, low 
status persons and widows, always have to take their turn at night, while 
influential people get water during the day. 
3.3 Maintenance 
Irrigation systems need a lot of maintenance work. Every year the canals have to 
be cleaned and repaired before the irrigation season starts. If there are no perma-
nent diversion works, these have to be built every year, but semi-permanent or 
permanent headworks are also frequently destroyed due to heavy monsoon 
floods and landslides. As mentioned above, full rights in an irrigation system 
involve the obligation to contribute to the maintenance of the system. The yearly 
maintenance work is done by labour and financial inputs of the water users 
themselves. The amount of work may be divided among the households of the 
users. Other ways to divide the work is on the basis of size of land or on the 
basis of water shares, or on the basis of one share for each settlement., Financial 
inputs are usually raised by the users. If the government has made permanent 
structures, financial demands for maintenance are relatively low and labour is 
recruited from among the users. However, the costs of repairs after floods or 
landslides may be far too high for the users. Nowadays, the government often 
pays at least a substantial part of the repairs. Participation in maintenance estab-
lishes or confirms rights to water. Because of that, persons who are not granted 
full rights usually may not participate in regular maintenance work, but they can 
called upon for emergency repairs. Emergency repair does not establish rights to 
water. 
3.4 Principles, rights and negotiations 
Many of these provisions have the character of principles rather than of rules. 
They legitimate access, control, management and utilization of water by vil-
lages, groups, families and individuals. However, no constellation of water 
rights between different right holders or the group rights to water in actual rivers 
and irrigation canals can be directly deduced from legal principles. Such princi-
ples require concretization as water rights in relation to the concrete ecological 
and socio-political situation. This means a clarification of what the general prin-
ciples mean in terms of actual rights-relationships in a specific social and eco-
logical context. To some extent this clarification is also necessary because the 
various principles derive from different legal orders and/or may also be mutually 
exclusive and because it is not certain which principle has priority over another. 
They provide a repertoire of accepted justifications and options of possible 
arrangements, but do not lead unequivocally to particular solutions. 
In the agreements and settlements that are reached in negotiations it is estab-
lished which of the principles are followed and in which hierarchy. There are 
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many occasions on which new regulations have to be made about access, distribu-
tion, operation and management. This is necessary when people want to build a 
new canal, when existing structures have been destroyed, when new crops are 
introduced, and when an existing system is being rehabilitated and enlarged. 
Rehabilitation projects in particular are often felt to have been imposed upon local 
communities, in which users have not had a voice, and in which they feel their 
interests and rights have not been fully taken into account. This is a complaint that 
is heard in particular from the old users. As will be seen, new users may profit 
from the projects and from the fact that it is initiated by the government, because 
that gives them a legitimation for their use of the system which they did not have 
previously. The resulting changed allocation, distribution, operation and mainte-
nance systems distribute the burdens and profits in very different ways. 
Shukla et al. describe the results of such negotiations in terms of a set of 
agreements, or a social contract, in which the irrigators realize their own claims 
and acknowledge the claims of others, thereby "making every effort to maxi-
mize the benefits of irrigation".19 This is a rather euphemistic representation of 
the fighting, pressing and disputing that goes on among the various users and 
other participants. To be sure, agreements are made, but often grudgingly and 
provisionally until times have changed and new alliances may bring a chance to 
negotiate a more advantageous agreement. Negotiations are usually intense and 
sometimes fierce. This is not surprising given the high economic interests that 
are at stake. As we shall see, ffie outcome of negotiations depends on the mutual 
interests and strength of participants, their wish to look for workable solutions 
and the extent to which they manage to mobilize support for their standpoint. 
4. CONTESTING RIGHTS - PRECARIOUS NEGOTIATED ORDERS 
4.1 Case 1: The negotiated order of Jivanpur and Badgaon irrigation20 
More than 100 years ago, a Tharu feudal landlord (zamindar) of Badgaon, in the 
Chitwan Valley of the inner Terai, built the village's first irrigation canal with its 
intake in the Budhi Rapti River. He later abandoned the canal because it was too 
labour intensive to maintain. The abandoned canal from the Budhi Rapti River 
was later taken over by tenants from a small settlement, Pipra, in which drainage 
water from a canal upstream was collected. In 1922 the landlord with the help of 
his villagers, dug a canal to a parallel river, Dhonjre Khola. From then on 
Badgaon was in continuous competition over water with its neighbouring Village 
Surtana, located at the other side of the river, which also had an irrigation canal 
built by its landlord with an intake from Dhongre Khola. Over time Dhongre 
Khola dianged its course several times and each time Badgaon or Surtana were 
A.N. Shukla et al., "Dynamism in water rights and arbitration on water right conflicts: cases of 
farmer managed irrigation systems form East Chitwan". Paper presented at the workshop on 
Waterrights, Conflict, and Policy, Kathmandu, 22-24 Jan. 1996. 
This case is described in A.N. Shukla et al., supra note 19. Additional information was col-
lected during a brief field visit in Feb. 1996. 
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forced to change the place of their intakes, and each time there was a dispute in 
which a new agreement was negotiated. Sometimes Surtana managed to move 
its intake upstream from Badgaon, and then it was the other way around. 
In 1958 the village Jivanpur, at the initiative of its former feudal landlord con-
structed a canal with its intake in the Budhi Rapti River, close to the place where 
the drainage water of the abandoned Badgaon canal was collected. They claimed 
to be the oldest settlers in the area and therefore to have prior rights. After a 
flood of the Dhongre Khola in 1970, the river ceased to be dependable for irriga-
tion and Badgaon had to look for additional water, and again searched for ways 
of getting it from the Budhi Rapti River. From that time on, Badgaon and 
Jivanpur were in continuous contest for Budhi Rapti water. This led to a series 
of arrangements in which their mutual relationship was negotiated over and over 
again and in which Badgaon over time managed to get an ever larger part of the 
water against increasingly favourable conditions. 
Badgaon approached the Chairman of the Village Development Committee, 
the (ex-) landlord of Jivanpur, who granted them access to their old canal, 
because it was assumed that Badgaon together with Pipra would mainly use the 
drainage water through its formerly abandoned canal. But Badgaon needed more 
and started again to tap water directly from the Budhi Rapti River at the place 
where Jivanpur also had its intake. Because the Badgaon canal was on lower 
land than the Jivanpur canal, more water flowed towards Badgaon than to 
Jivanpur. Jivanpur farmers complained to the Development Committee 
Chairman, who negotiated a settlement according to which Badgaon would get 
one-quarter and Jivanpur three-quarters of the water. The reason given was that 
Badgaon had access to Dhongre Khola as well and therefore did not need as 
much water as Jivanpur which depended entirely on the Budhi Rapti River. New 
arrangements had also to be made for maintenance and repair matters. It was 
decided that each household would contribute labour and cash. Badgaon, having 
four times as many households than Jivanpur, thus had to contribute about four 
times as much as Jivanpur. 
Badgaon continued to use more water than was agreed.' A new development 
was that in 1987 a government rehabilitation project diverted the drainage water 
away from Badgaon with the promise to rehabilitate Badgaon's system so that 
they would no longer depend on this drainage water. Badgaon farmers then 
changed the division at the intake at the Budhi Rapti River so that they got one-
third instead of one-quarter of the water, but in fact because of the advantaged 
position of their canal, they would even get more than one-third. Understandably, 
Jivanpur objected strongly. In 1992 the dispute erupted and was brought to the 
Village Development Committee. The Chairman negotiated a new (written) 
agreement: in the future, one-third of the water should be for Badgaon, and two-
thirds for Jivanpur. They would jointly mobilize all resources necessary for main-
tenance-and repair of the system, as well as for possible resources for government 
rehabilitation projects, in proportion to the area which they had under irrigation. 
This meant in effect that Badgaon, which had about three and a half times as 
much land under irrigation as Jivanpur, would have to contribute three and a half 
times as much as Jivanpur. The flood of 1993 washed away the intake and the-
government stepped in with a large rehabilitation programme. Again, Badgaon 
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took that opportunity to start negotiating a better agreement with Jivanpur, but 
Jivanpur objected. The government made it clear that it would only provide aid to 
those who would manage to settle their disputes and much pressure was put on 
Badgaon and Jivanpur to do so. Badgaon felt it was carrying an unjustly heavy 
burden and wanted half of the water, on the ground that it had a much larger area 
under irrigation. Jivanpur was irritated because Badgaon continued to "steal 
water" and take almost three-quarters instead of the one-third it was entitled to. 
Once more the Chairman of the Development Committee offered his mediation 
and proposed an agreement according to which the villages would each get one-
half of the water, while the resources for the rehabilitation project would be 
divided according to area under irrigation. Each system would contribute one half 
of the resources for maintenance. The dispute went on until early 1996, when 
pressure from the side of the project management became so high that they 
threatened to cancel all assistance. In February 1996 the two villages finally came 
to the agreement that each would receive one half of the water and contribute one 
half of the resources, under the condition that there would be a permanent divi-
sion structure, which would put a stop to further theft of water. 
The case shows how over a period of time water rights are renegotiated over 
and over again among users of adjacent systems. In the course of time, Badgaon 
managed to get a larger share of the water under more favourable conditions. It 
might be asked why its share was initially so small and why it became larger 
subsequently. The reasons for the small share were twofold. In the first place 
Jivanpur considered Badgaon as newcomers, who therefore had a lesser right. 
Secpndly, they argued that Badgaon could tap from another source and therefore 
needed less water from the Budhi Rapti River than Jivanpur which depended 
entirely on that river. But over time the relationship changed. In their struggle to 
get more water and contribute less labour and financial inputs, Badgaon referred 
to different, but also recognized, principles from those which had been embod-
ied in the regulation agreed upon in the earlier agreements. Although the princi-
ple of contribution according to household, or equal shares for villages, were 
both basically acceptable principles, this does not explain why the alternatives 
were accepted by Jivanpur, who seemed to lose every time new negotiations 
were entered into. One reason was that Badgaon people were of higher caste 
and status, were better educated and had better connections to administrative 
offices and to influential party members. Moreover, the rehabilitation project 
preferred a "just" 50-50 solution. Another reason was that Badgaon had in 
effect continuously taken far more than its share and Jivanpur had been unable 
to effectuate its own claims. Jivanpur therefore insisted that a permanent divi-
sion weir be constructed, even though the project had planned a less permanent 
gabion structure. With the construction of the permanent structure, stealing 
would become almost impossible, or so Jivanpur hoped. They felt that the new 
agreement would in practice bring them a more favourable position than before, 
even though the official regulation may have been "worse. Thus, the permanent 
structure was a way to prevent further disputing.21 Jivanpur farmers hoped that 
Durga and Pradhan, supra note 17. 
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this negotiated order would be less unstable and less in discord with practice 
than the ones before. ' 
4.2 Case 2: From water theft to water right in the Telia Kulo irrigation 
system22 
The Telia Kulo irrigation command area, located in the Bijauri administrative 
village area, which belongs to the Dang district in the Terai, was constructed 
between 150 and 200 years ago by the Majhgainyas, feudal landlords (zamin-
dars), and has until recently been managed under their supervision. The area 
consists of two main types of arable land: fields entitled to permanent irrigation 
(khet) and fields allowed access to irrigation in the winter season only (bhit). In 
the past local rules strictly prohibited change to the existing arrangement by 
diverting irrigation water to bhit land, converting it into khet land. The ruling 
Majhgainya landowners, fearing that their monsoon crops in the tail of the 
command area would suffer from water shortage if too much land was converted 
into khet land, used to punish bhit land farmers severely when they were caught 
diverting water from the canal during monsoon. These water stealing Bhitwalas, 
as the bhit farmers were called, were fined and their livestock and household 
items were forcibly seized. Village authorities, mainly dominated by 
Majhgainyas, never intervened on the Bhitwalas' behalf. This changed, 
however, when the Majhgainyas' local power and influence, as well as their 
interest in irrigation management, started to decline. The decline of Majhgainyas 
dominance coincided with demographic changes in the region as well as tech-
nology, crop choice, and changes in legislation. Increasing government inter-
vention, immigration and land reform brought about more intensive cultivation, 
smaller land holdings and a growing demand for water. In the changing adminis-
trative and local power settings the (new) claimants' constant search for more 
water to irrigate their fields increasingly clashed with the prior appropriators' 
interests and established rights. 
At first only some other big landowners, rivals of the Majhgainyas, started to 
convert bhit land into khet. Encouraged by this example and supported by a few 
more liberal landlords, gradually some low caste, small farmers took to convert-
ing their bhit into khet as well. These Bhitwalas were also encouraged by the 
fact that the Majhgainyas at the time had lost their leading position in local 
village politics to rival elites, who were more sensitive to the bhitwalas' wishes. 
Of course the Majhgainyas objected and tried to fine the persons diverting water 
to their recently (illegally) developed khet lands; but after several interventions 
by the new village authorities on behalf of the water "thieves", the Majhgainyas 
came down a peg or two and entered into negotiations with the Bhitwalas. In 
This case is mainly based upon Mahesh Pradhan and Rajendra Pradhan, "Conflict as a means to 
acquire and protect water rights: A case study of conflicts in Dang". Paper presented at the work-
shop on "Water Rights, Conflict and Policy", Kathmandu, 22-24 Jan. 1996. Relevant informa-
tion has also been taken from R. Pradhan et al., "Laws, Rights and Equity: Implications of State 
Intervention in Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems". Paper presented at the workshop on 
"Water Rights, Conflict and Policy", Kathmandu, 22-24 Jan. 1996. 
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1984 a written document was drafted and signed which recognized the 
Majhgainyas historical claims but also claimed room for future new water rights 
for the Bhitwalas. 
These later developments came about because, between 1978 and 1982, the 
Nepal Department of Irrigation had set itself the task of carrying out a project of 
rehabilitation and extension of the Telia Kulo irrigation system. The Guhar 
River Irrigation Project (GIP) extended the main canal from 6 to 13 km covering 
700 ha instead of the 450 ha of the former Telia Kulo system. The new GIP 
system also planned to irrigate an additional 525 ha in a new command area, 
around Hemantapur village, which before had never been attached to the Telia 
Kulo system at all. According to Pradhan, Haq and Pradhan23 some of the vil-
lages in the planned new command area had so far only managed for a few years 
to buy some water for a few days annually. Hemantapur, one of the villages that 
for decades already had been trying to acquire full access to the Guhar River 
water resources for their winter crops, now, in the context of the GIP had seized 
their opportunity. They had persuaded the Dean óf the neighbouring Sanskrit 
Institute, whose lands, donated by the King, would also profit from access to the 
Guhar River resources, to plead their case with the King of Nepal. The Dean, 
who was close to the King, successfully requested the King to order the 
Department of Irrigation to include in its project ah extension of the Guhar River 
resources to the Hemantapm^area. 
Fearing that this new extension of the original Telia Kulo irrigation command 
area would cause water shortage, especially in the old Telia Kulo tail end, Telia 
Kdlo tail-enders, supported by their upstream relatives, succeeded in mobilizing 
sufficient political support at both local and national levels to get the GIP plans 
substantially modified..Rioting and damaging the already initiated headworks as 
well as petitioning the Prime Minister formed part of their political pressure. In 
1983 the Cabinet issued a decision. According to M. and R. Pradhan, the 
Cabinet decision ordered the plans for the additional command area to be 
reduced from 525 to 250 ha.24 The other authors on the Telia Kulo case, R. 
Pradhan, Haq and U. Pradhan, using the text of the letter that was sent by the 
Department of Irrigation to the GIP office, mention a further interesting point 
made in the text; one of its paragraphs says that for winter crops water from the 
GIP will be given only to the traditionally (sabik) irrigated fields of Telia Kulo.25 
This can be seen, as the authors remark, as an instance of upholding local cus-
tomary law by .the Cabinet. Yet the Cabinet decisjon also granted water for 250 
ha of new command area during the monsoon period. However, while in 
monsoon Hemantapur and its surrounding settlements had sufficient other water 
resources and did not really need the GIP water. Within the Telia Kulo system, 
as we have seen, competition for access to monsoon water had become endemic, 
which also was the reason why the customary (Majgainya) law excluding the 
Bhitwalas from monsoon irrigation was being re-negotiated. 
23
 Prahdan et ai., supra note 22. 
24
 Pradhan and Pradhan, supra note 22. 
25
 Pradhan et al., supra note 22. 
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In this process, the threatening inclusion of "outsiders" in the use of Guhar 
River water resources, which Telia Kulo farmers (head-enders, tail-enders, khet-
and bhit-farmers alike) apparently considered to constitute their own exclusive 
water source, as well as the involved political manoeuvering, may have been a 
factor in the more lenient attitude that was being taken by the Majhgainyas of 
Telia Kulo with respect to their "own" Bhitwala water "thieves". Another reason 
for this more lenient attitude is, more or less explicitly, hinted at in the text of 
the above mentioned agreement in which, after a formal recognition of the origi-
nal khet farmers' first right to the Telia Kulo water (followed by a provision 
allowing the Bhitwalas a modest amount of water on a rotational basis) a further 
sentence was added, stating (in the translation by M. and R. Pradhan): "We 
(bhitwalas) agree that once His Majesty's Government project is completed, we 
will accept its decisions regarding water allocation, howsoever and to whomso-
ever it decides to give water, and until then agree that the bhit lands will remain 
as bhit and the khet as khet". 
According to M. and R. Pradhan it has been confirmed in interviews with both 
Bithwalas and khet owning tail-enders in Telia Kulo that the idea behind this 
sentence in the agreement was to bring home the point that, as long as Telia 
Kulo was considered a non-government (private) system it was just and lawful 
that the prior right to its water should remain with the descendants of the first 
irrigators, but now that Telia Kulo had become a government (public) system in 
the form of GIP, the traditional bhit holders and newcomers as Nepali citizens 
could also claim a full right to the system's water. As the authors note: "As if to 
emphasize this point, they [now] call the canal Sarkari Kulo [government kulo] 
or [just] Sinchai Kulo (irrigation kulo) instead of Telia Kulo". From the view-
point of the GIP this would be only correct, because, as R. Pradhan, Haq and U. 
Pradhan remark, the Department of Irrigation claims that, on the basis of the 
Electricity and Related Water Resources Act (1967), it follows from the 
Department's investments in rehabilitation and extension of the canal that the 
Department has taken over the Telia Kulo system.26 
Anyhow, whether Telia Kulo was further to be considered a government 
system or not, until recently the matter does not seem to have had immediate 
significance. The Bhitwalas neither contributed nor were allowed to contribute 
labour for repairs and maintenance. The original irrigators feared that if they 
allowed the Bhitwalas to contribute labour they might indeed claim full water 
rights in the future. Over the past few years, however, the tail-end khet farmers 
seem to have more or less accepted the fact that the Bithwalas will divert water 
to their fields, legally or illegally. An important feature in the process of gradual 
accommodation, moreover, is the development of kinship relations between 
bigger Bhitwala farmers and Majhgainya elites; a bigger Bhitwala farmer marry-
ing a daughter to an influential Majhgainya may prove an asset in securing 
"unofficial" water rights. 
Finally, "rather than ignoring them, attempts are made to coopt them within 




 Pradhan and Pradhan, supra noie 22. « 
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area of Kashipur village, the recently converted khet lands are not allocated 
water officially, but the (former) Bhitwalas are allowed to deliver water to their 
fields unofficially and are even allowed to contribute labour for emergency 
repairs of the canal. Initially their contributions were left out of the records, but 
that is also changing even to the extent that their labour contributions are actu-
ally demanded. In other cases, as in the Kharkare settlement area, as M. and R. 
Pradhan note, it has started to be considered good policy to officially allot 
certain minor water rights (a few hours a day) to their "potential water thieves" 
in order to dissuade them from diverting water at the times they themselves may 
see fit to do so. This arrangement does not allow these new beneficiaries to con-
tribute their labour for system maintenance for fear of letting the "thieves" 
establish formal rights. Here, a combination of legal parameters and expediency 
seems to force the water users associations to create, in the words of the authors, 
. a category of "accepted free riders". 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The two cases show how dynamic the development and change in constella-
tions of water rights are. Changes in ecological conditions and agricultural pro-
duction patterns, which change the availability of and the need for water, 
necessitate frequent renegotiating of rights to water. Physical factors are a 
crucial element'in the establishment and maintenance of rights for several 
reasons. Negotiations become urgent whenever an intake or irrigation canal 
structure is destroyed by floods; but there are other reasons as well. In the 
Jivanpur-Badgaon case the fact that the Badgaon canal led through lower land 
than the Jivanpur canal, made it an absolute necessity for Jivanpur to enter into 
negotiations in order to stop Badgaon from stealing water. Their arguments 
focused on the issue of the priority right of first settlers to take water in from 
the river. In the Telia Kulo case, it was also the physical lay-out which made it 
impossible to enforce theft prevention. Here, the negotiations turned around 
two questions, i.e. the question óf whether bhit land owners had a right to 
convert their land into irrigated land, and secondly, who was entitled to use the 
water from the canal after rehabilitation. The owners of old irrigated land 
denied the new claimants a right on the basis of their prior use rights, whereas 
the new claimants defined the rehabilitated canal as a government canal, to 
which all persons within the command area have à right. The negotiations also 
revolved around the question of who was obliged and entitled to participate in 
the maintenance of the canal. In the Telia Kulo case people were excluded from 
participation in the work in order to exclude them from full rights to water. In 
the Jivanpur case there was no disagreement that Badgaon was entitled to some 
water, and no-one wanted to exclude them altogether. Here the dispute turned 
around the amount of water and extent of the villages' contribution to mainte-
nance. As we have seen, Jivanpur was prepared to make considerable conces-
sions, but insisted on a physical structure that would give maximum protection 
against further theft. In Telia Kulo, too, considerable, though "unofficial" con-
cessions were eventually made. 
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The cases illustrate how a number of interconnected factors underlie the 
highly unstable nature of water rights in these irrigation systems: unstable geo-
morphic conditions and changes in the physical structure force people to pract-
ically rebuild the system, change the location of intakes and the course of a 
canal, which requires a new concretization of water rights related to the changed 
physical structure. Increase in population, especially as a result of immigration, 
increases the pressure of taking new land under cultivation, turning unlevelled 
and unirrigated land into levelled and irrigated rice land, and to allow land to be 
irrigated both in the winter season and during monsoon. The introduction of new 
crops, especially of high yielding varieties of rice and new cash crops, and inno-
vation of irrigation techniques have increased demands for water and often 
changed the irrigation cycles. New irrigation techniques often coincided with 
enlargement of a command area, an ensuing increase of the number of users and 
changes in water rights. These changes in the agricultural-economy have made 
water an increasingly scarce resource and have intensified competition among 
the users seriously. Changes in the state administration at various levels and 
changes in legislation concerning land tenure and rights to water, have changed 
the local power constellation among former feudal landlords and old landed 
elites, small landowners, migrant farmers, new emerging elites, local administra-
tors, higher authorities, and project functionaries. Still, when the feudal system 
was officially abolished and replaced by a system of bureaucratic office holders, 
many old feudal families remained large landowners, despite the land reforms, 
and continued to initiate irrigation works. Many members of the old feudal fam-
ilies managed to obtain a position in the new administrative apparatus; their his-
torically grown networks with their relations of political authority and economic 
dependence remained largely intact. The invasion of foreign donor institutions 
has occasioned the rise of new local institutions, the Water Users Associations 
with their own authority structure over matters of water management. 
Technological innovations, especially if introduced by the government or 
donor agencies, changing agricultural practices, but above all the frequent 
destruction of existing physical structures due to ecological catastrophes, regu-
larly provide occasions to contest exclusion from water and to change inconve-
nient arrangements. Contesting water rights almost inevitably become involved 
in these wider networks of power relationships and become strongly affected by 
the relationship between the persons in key positions. The provisional character 
of water rights and their instability through time is thus enhanced by the shifting 
networks of political relationships in which the negotiation and decision making 
processes over water rights take place. The Telia Kulo case demonstrates this 
particularly vividly. As we have seen, kinship ties, caste and status play an 
important role in the power structure. Badgaon was of higher status and gener-
ally speaking of higher caste than Jivanpur, which made it more difficult for 
Jivanpur to assert its rights, and from the moment low caste farmers in the Telia 
Kulo command area were backed by new elites, they were no longer punished 
by the old feudal landlord family. 
The government and donor agencies are often an additional source of uncer-
tainty and dispute, because they interfere in existing rights, often without 
acknowledging that they are doing so. Thus, prior right holders may feel they 
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are expropriated, but their arguments are not taken seriously in a- development 
policy context where water is considered to be a matter involving all users 
together, and where the government regards it as its task to develop an area and 
improve the irrigation situation.28 Thus, the project management showed little 
interest in Jivanpur's arguments and pressed it to agree to a 50-50 settlement. 
Although the power structure at a given time is of crucial importance for the 
outcome of negotiations, these are also formulated in terms of law. In order to 
justify their claims, either to defend existing rights, or to obtain new rights, 
people have a reservoir of legal rules and principles at their disposal. These 
include the existing negotiated order, in the form of the last agreement that was 
made, former agreements, references to newly made state legislation, as well as 
to principles that are considered to be legitimate - but only rarely are people 
aware of the existence of different legal systems. As we have seen in the case of 
Telia Kulo, reference to government law occurs especially when new users 
come in with the support of an irrigation project financed by outside donors, but 
against the wishes of older rightholders. The only way for the bhitwalas to legit-
imize their claim was to refer to the government status of the canal. With the 
increasing numbers of immigrants and the ensuing increasing need for water, 
negotiating in the shadow of a quickly changing legal, administrative and tech-
nological universe appears to have increasingly become a means of acquiring 
access to water for those who had no access to water before, while old owners 
are losing control over water and are forced to share it with others, whom they 
no longer can exclude. 
Pradhan et al., supra note 22. 
